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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 574-2a-3(2)(j) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
These Oblates agree with Colosimos' standards of review with the exception of the 
following. 
1. The District Court erred by dismissing case because Plaintiffs were entitled 
to conduct discovery prior to dismissal. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. American Towers Owners Association 
v. CCI Mechanical Inc. 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996); United Park City Mine Co. v. 
Greater Park City Co.. 870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993). Utah R. Civ. P. 56ffl. We review a 
trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion under this rule under the abuse of 
discretion standard. Crossland Sav. v. Hatch 877 P.2d 1241, 143 (Utah 1994). While a 
parties underlying Rule 56(f) request is to be liberally considered, such motions may be 
properly denied where they are found to be "lacking in merit." IdL (citations omitted.) 
3. The District Court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that the statute of 
limitations had run against Plaintiffs' claims. 
"Whether a trial court appropriately granted summary judgment is a question of 
law." Holmes Dev. LLC v. Cook 2002 UT 38, P21 (citing Hill v. Allred. 28 P.3d 1271 
(Utah 2001) and Rivera v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co.. 1 P.3d 539 (Utah 2000). "In 
determining if summary judgment was appropriate, [an appellate court] need review only 
whether the trial court erred by applying the governing law and whether a material fact 
1 
was in dispute." Id. (citing Hill 2002 UT 16 at P12). A trial court's legal conclusions are 
reviewed for correctness. Id. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND 
RULES 
U.S. Constitution amend. VII § 10 
U.S. Constitution amend. XIV § 1 
Utah Constitution, Art. I § 7 
Utah Constitution, Art. 1 § 10 
Utah Constitution, Art. I § 11 
Utah Constitution, Art. I § 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3) (2002) 
Rule 12(b)(1), Utah. R.Civ.P. 
Rule 12(b)(2), Utah. R.Civ.P. 
Rule 12(b)(6), Utah R.Civ.P. 
Rule56(c), Utah R.Civ.P. 
Rule 56(f), Utah R.Civ.P. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Colosimos commenced an action against the Oblates of St. Francis De Sales, 
Thomas P. O'Neill, Francis J. Gross, and W. Ivan Cendese, (the "Oblates") on February 
18, 2003, asserting causes of action for aggravated sexual assault and battery, negligence, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
invasion of privacy, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, false imprisonment, and punitive 
damages. (Record 1-18.) All of the Defendants in this action, except Rapp, who failed 
to appear in the action, filed Motions to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment. (Record 
54 - 152) A hearing was held before the District Court on Defendants' Motions on July 
22, 2003, at which time the Court heard the arguments of all parties, considered the 
pleadings, memoranda, and affidavits submitted by the parties. On August 22, 2003, the 
District Court entered a Memorandum Decision, converting the various Motions to 
Dismiss to Motions for Summary Judgment and granted judgment in favor of the 
Defendants, and dismissed the Complaint, with prejudice. (Record 573 - 584, 589 - 591.) 
The Court's Order and Judgment was entered September 15, 2003. The basis of the 
dismissal was based upon the fact that the statute of limitations had run as against the 
Colosimos' claims. IdL The Colosimos have appealed that ruling. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Ralph and Charles have always known that Mr. Rapp was an Oblate, a 
priest and a teacher, and that those roles were intertwined in his position at Judge 
Memorial High School. (Record 6 - 8). 
2. Ralph and Charles were taught from an early age to revere priests (Record 
4, Complaint at If 17); and as a priest and teacher, Rapp's "position of special trust with 
respect to plaintiffs" was integral to the dynamic of the alleged abuse and to the claimed 
resulting injuries. (Record 8 - 9, 13 - 14). 
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3. After the spring of 1973 and forward, James F. Rapp did not act as a 
teacher and was not under the supervision of the Oblates. (Record 6). 
4. Ralph Colosimo was over the age of 18 at most, if not all, of the time the 
alleged abuse occurred. (Record 6-7) (cf. Ralph's 18 year old birthday [9/20/71] with 
dates in Complaint at ffl[26 and 29) ( Record 57 - 61, 117). 
5. Ralph admits that "obvious emotional and physical harm resulted 
immediately from [Rapp's] abuse . . . ." (Record 7) (emphasis supplied). 
6. Some time in 1975, Ralph received from Rapp an admission that Rapp was 
a pedophile, and confirmation that Rapp was abusing Charles, his junior brother by 8 
years. (Record 8-9, 111, 117). This admission was at least three years after Ralph had 
become an adult. (Record 57 - 61). 
7. Despite reaching the age of majority over 30 years ago, Ralph made no 
attempt to investigate claims he had against the Defendants, including Rapp, even though 
he admittedly remembered at least some of the abuse. (Record 193 - 195). 
8. In contrast to Ralph, Charles has not alleged repressed memory of the abuse 
like his brother, Charles also made no effort to investigate his claims during the last 20 
years since reaching age 18.( Record, 577-578.) 
9. Charles began seeing a therapist in June 1997 specifically concerning the 
alleged abuse. (Record 118). 
10. On November 24, 2000, Charles sent a letter to Monsignor Fitzgerald of the 
Salt Lake Diocese outlining the abuse he had suffered. (Record 393). The letter to 
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Monsignor Fitzgerald demonstrates Charles' long held knowledge of the elements of his 
claims: 
a. that inappropriate sexual conduct occurred; 
b. that Rapp was a teacher and an Oblate priest; and 
c. that the dynamics of the abuse and the resulting injuries were 
directly linked to Rapp's positions. 
11. The Complaint was not filed by the plaintiffs until February 18, 2003. 
(Record 1-18). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly concluded both Charles and Ralph Colosimo's claims were 
barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3). The 
undisputed facts set forth in plaintiffs' pleadings and sworn affidavits show the following: 
(1) Ralph Colosimo was an adult when most of the abuse by James Rapp occurred; (2) 
Ralph Colosimo was aware of the abuse to himself, the injury to himself, the perpetrator 
of the abuse, and the perpetrator's relationship to the other entities in this action while the 
abuse occurred and, to some extent, immediately after it occurred; (3) the abuse against 
Ralph Colosimo and his knowledge of it occurred some 30 years ago; (4) Ralph Colosimo 
suppressed some, but not all, of his memories of the abuse; (5) Charles Colosimo was 
aware of the abuse to himself, the injury to himself, the perpetrator of the abuse, and the 
perpetrator's relationship to the other entities in this action while the abuse occurred and 
at all times following the abuse; (6) the abuse against Charles Colosimo occurred at least 
5 
20 years ago; (7) Charles Colosimo has never suppressed his memory of the abuse or its 
affects on him; (8) Charles Colosimo knew of the abuse and its injury to him when he 
became an adult. Based on these facts, the trial court correctly determined the applicable 
statute of limitations barred both plaintiffs' claims. 
Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue the statute should be tolled for four reasons: (1) 
plaintiffs could not have discovered their cause of action until 2002; (2) Ralph suppressed 
his memory of the abuse; (3) the abuse is capable of being corroborated; and (4) the other 
defendants concealed their co-complicity in the abuse. First, the undisputed facts above 
show each plaintiff was aware of the abuse after becoming an adult, was aware of the 
injury to himself and aware of the perpetrator of the injury. Accordingly, the facts do not 
support plaintiffs' argument and warrant application of the statute of limitations. 
Second, to the extent any memories of the abuse were suppressed by Ralph 
Colosimo, the memories were not suppressed, if at all, until after Ralph became an adult. 
More importantly, neither plaintiff has offered any testimony that aH memory of the 
abuse was suppressed before becoming an adult. Both plaintiffs had memory of the 
abuse while an adult and within the applicable limitations period. In short, this is not a 
case of suppressed memory in a child sexual abuse case. The only plaintiff who was 
abused while a minor was Charles, and Charles stated that he never suppressed his 
memory of the abuse. 
Third, the fact that James Rapp's abuse of children is capable of corroboration 
does not help these two plaintiffs. As discussed, both plaintiffs had knowledge of the 
6 
abuse as an adult. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly and unequivocally determined 
that corroboration of abuse is meaningful only in proving a later retrieved suppressed 
memory is accurate and a proper basis for proving the abuse actually occurred. The Utah 
Supreme Court's standard for applying the discovery rule is actually broader than those 
states which require corroboration by clear and convincing evidence in order to toll the 
statute of limitations. In other words, Utah will apply the discovery rule to toll a statute 
of limitations on a lesser showing than clear and convincing evidence. As the trial court 
concluded, plaintiffs cannot even meet this lower standard for application of the 
discovery rule. 
Finally, the alleged co-complicity of the other defendants, even if true, is not 
relevant to whether plaintiffs could have asserted claims within the applicable limitations 
period. It is undisputed that plaintiffs knew the identity of the perpetrator of the abuse, 
James Rapp. It is also undisputed that plaintiffs knew the abuse was occurring and the 
damage it was causing to them. Additionally, it is undisputed the plaintiffs knew James 
Rapp was a priest with the Catholic Church and Diocese, an Oblate and a teacher at 
Judge Memorial. The other entities' potential culpability all stems from the abuse by 
James Rapp. Neither plaintiff asserted a claim against James Rapp within the limitations 
period. Neither plaintiff attempted to investigate the other defendant's knowledge of 
Rapp's conduct. This failure to timely assert a claim for the abuse is fatal to plaintiffs' 
claims against the other entities. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COLOSIMOS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO CONDUCT 
DISCOVERY ON FACTS THAT WOULD NOT BE LEGALLY 
RELEVANT. 
The Colosimos are arguing that the District Court's dismissal based upon the 
various Motions to Dismiss and/or Motions for Summary Judgment was improper in that 
the Colosimos were not allowed to conduct discovery. (Appellants' Brief, Point II.) No 
amount of discovery would bring the Colosimos' claims within the applicable statutes of 
limitations. Further, the Colosimos never argued to the District Court that they could not 
have discovered, or were prevented from bringing their claims within the limitations 
period, merely that they did not bring the claims "because they had no reason to suspect 
the Defendants might be responsible for Rapp's actions until May of 2002" when they 
read a newspaper article. (Record 215-216). 
The Colosimos were always aware that Mr. Rapp was a priest, an Oblate, and a 
teacher at Judge Memorial High School during the relevant time period. (Record 6 - 8). 
Ralph Colosimo admits that he did not repress all incidences of the abuse which he 
suffered, and Charles Colosimo does not claim to have repressed any of the memories of 
the abuse whatsoever. (Record 237 - 242, 577 - 578). It is unclear what discovery would 
have unearthed in order to change these important and undisputed facts. 
The Colosimos' claim to be "at a significant disadvantage because most of the 
information needed to prove their case against the various Defendants (other than Rapp) 
is in the Defeadants' exclusive possession." (Brief at 13.) All of the relevant information 
8 
needed to bring the cause of action was known by the Colosimos for decades prior to 
bringing the Complaint. The Colosimos have not alleged a single instance where they 
asked even preliminary or rudimentary questions in the decades following the alleged 
abuse. There are no conceivable facts which could be discovered that would change the 
fact that the Colosimos must make an initial showing that they did not know and could 
not have reasonably discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to 
commence an action within that period. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 
482, 490 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("The mere averment of exclusive knowledge or facts by 
the moving party is not adequate....") 
The Colosimos were clearly aware of all of the necessary elements in which to 
bring a timely lawsuit. As the appellate courts in Utah have stated on numerous 
occasions: "[e]ven if the facts plaintiff believed would be discovered were actually borne 
out, they would not have been legally relevant to the narrow issue before the court on 
summary judgment." American Towers Owners Assoc, v. CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 
P.2d 1182, 1195 (Utah 1996) (quoting Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 561-
562 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)). All of the issues on appeal center around whether or not they 
Colosimos timely asserted their Complaint. Based upon the facts as alleged in the 
Complaint, and Ralph Colosimos' Affidavit, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the 56(f) Motion, and properly dismissed the Complaint. 
It is irrelevant for purposes of the Motions before the District Court, and for this 
appeal, what information is within the Defendants' control and possession. None of 
9 
those discovery issues would solve the fundamental problem facing the Colosimos: They 
were aware of the facts and circumstances surrounding their alleged abuse by Rapp. 
Plaintiffs were aware that he was an Oblate, a priest, and a teacher at Judge Memorial 
High School at all times and did nothing to investigate their claims. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated: 
"[W]here the circumstances are such as to suggest to a 
person of ordinary intelligence the probability that he has been 
defrauded, the duty of inquiry arises, and if he omits that 
inquiry, when it would have developed the truth, and shuts his 
eyes to the facts which call for investigation, knowledge of the 
fraud will be imputed to him." 
United Park Citv Mines Co. v. Greater Park Citv Co.. 870 P.2d 880 (Utah 1993) (quoting 
Higginsv. Crouse. 147 NY 411, 416, 42N.E. 6 (1895) and Armstrong v. McAlpin. 699 F.2d 
79 (2nd Cir. 1983) (citations omitted)). 
The Colosimos not only knew facts and circumstances which would suggest to a 
person of ordinary intelligence that they had been abused by Mr. Rapp, an Oblate priest, 
and teacher at Judge Memorial High School, but shut their eyes to the facts which called 
out for investigation. The Court clearly did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
Colosimos' request, under Rule 56(f), for discovery into facts and knowledge which is 
imputed to them under the United Park City Mines Co. case. 
Finally, in support of their argument that discovery should have been allowed, the 
Colosimos' state: "Charles might find other facts upon which he might base his claims, 
bringing it under the 'exceptional circumstances' prong of the discovery rule." 
10 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 31) (emphasis added). The Colosimos simply are not entitled to 
engage in this type of "fishing expedition" in an attempt to conjure up facts to support 
their allegations and to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Callioux v. Progressive 
Insurance Company. 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). The District Court was 
correct in its denial of the Colosimos' request to conduct discovery when they could not 
indicate what facts could possibly be discovered which would allow them to survive the 
various motions filed by the named defendants, including the Oblates. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE 
COLOSIMOS' COMPLAINT CONSISTENT WITH UTAH LAW. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the District Court stated "the court having now 
considered the pleadings, and memoranda, including supporting and counter affidavits 
submitted by the parties, and the arguments of counsel, treats this matter as a Motion for 
Summary Judgment under Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (Record 574.) 
The Court further explained that it was not looking at whether the plaintiffs would prevail 
on the matter should it be tried, "but whether they would be entitled to present evidence 
[in the case] at all in this matter." Id The Oblates had argued that, even if taken as true, 
the Colosimos were not entitled to bring this matter to trial. (Record 54 - 77). The 
District Court agreed that the Colosimos would not be able to present evidence based 
11 
upon the passing of the statute of limitations. (Record 573-584.) The Colosimos are 
now asking this Court to excuse their failure to timely file their cause of action.1 
While it is true that a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in the light most 
favorable to plaintiff, when dealing with a 12(b)(6) Motion, the very nature of a 12(b)(6) 
Motion to Dismiss challenges the fact that even if true, the plaintiff has no right to relief 
based upon the facts as stated. Nelson v. Standard Corp. 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995). 
The "Appellate Court will affirm the trial court's decision if it appears that the 
[Colosimos] cannot prove any set of facts in support of its claims." See Russell/Packard 
Development Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316, [^10, 78 P.3d 616 (citing Dansie v. 
Anderson Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). The Colosimos have 
claimed that based upon their failure to include exact dates on which the events occurred, 
that a Motion to Dismiss under 12(b)(6) is improper, and again argue that with the 
opportunity to conduct discovery, they may have been able to create a genuine issue of 
material fact. (Brief at 16-17, 31.) The Colosimos are simply not entitled to the relief 
which they are seeking. 
In Tucker v. State Farm, 2002 UT 54, 53 P.3d 947, the Utah Supreme Court stated 
"in the narrow circumstance where a plaintiffs complaint describes events which 
*The Colosimos had initially argued that the Oblates could not raise the issue of 
statute of limitations in a Motion to Dismiss. ( Record at 574.) The District Court 
clarified this issue by relying on Tucker v. State Farm, 53 P.3d 947, and treated the 
motions before it as motions for summary judgment. (Record 573-575.) 
12 
establish when the statute of limitation begins to run but fails to explicitly set forth the 
relevant date on which those events occurred, defendant may raise a statute of limitations 
defense in a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provided the court treats the motion as one for summary judgment...." Id at 11. The 
Colosimos' Complaint clearly describes events which establish when the statute of 
limitations began to run, even though they did not set forth all of the relevant dates. 
(Record 6 - 9). Based upon the facts as alleged, and taking these facts as true, the 
District Court did in fact treat this matter as a motion for summary judgment. The 
Colosimos' Complaint clearly describes events which establish when the statute of 
limitations began to run, even though they did not set forth relevant dates. (Record 6 - 9). 
By way of example, Ralph Colosimo alleged that he was a student at Judge 
Memorial High School from 1969 to 1972, was abused by Rapp from 1970 or 1971 until 
1975, after his graduation from high school, and that Charlie had been abused from 1972 
to 1975. (Record 6 - 8). Charles Colosimo never alleged that he repressed a single 
incident of abuse, and Ralph Colosimo admitted that he did not repress all instances of 
abuse, merely many instances of abuse. (Record 237 - 239). For purposes of the statute 
of limitations, there was no genuine issue as to any material facts even giving the 
Colosimos every reasonable inference.2 The relevant undisputed facts, including dates, 
2It was undisputed that Ralph Colosimo claims to have been "abused" until he was 
approximately 21 years of age, and Charles until he was 13 or 14 years old. It was also 
undisputed that Ralph Colosimo turned 18 while still a student at Judge Memorial High 
School. (Record 1 - 18, 54 - 77). 
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were contained within the Complaint and in Affidavits supplied by the Colosimos, and 
the District Court ultimately ruled that it lacked jurisdiction due to the running of the 
statute of limitations based upon the facts as alleged. 
It is well settled in Utah that a statute of limitations defense can be raised in a 
Motion to Dismiss. See Tucker. 2002 UT 54 at [^10; see also Keller v. Southwood N. 
Med. Pavilioru Inc.. 959 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1998) ("A party waives a statute of 
limitations defense by failing to raise it in a responsive pleading or by motion...." 
(emphasis in original)). It is irrelevant under what standard the Court viewed the Motion 
to Dismiss or Motion for Summary Judgment so long as the Colosimos were given every 
reasonable inference. (Record 583.) 
As argued, the Complaint itself clearly identifies sufficient facts to show that the 
statute of limitations had long since run, and the Colosimos were not entitled to relief 
based upon the facts as alleged. The Colosimos' Complaint falls within the "narrow 
instance where a plaintiffs complaint describes events which establish when a statute of 
limitations begins to run, but fails to explicitly set forth a relevant date on which those 
events occurred...." Tucker, 2002 UT 54 at f^l 1. 
The Colosimos were aware of every relevant fact in order to bring a cause of 
action within the statutory time frame. There is no genuine issue as to any material facts, 
and the Colosimos would not be entitled to present evidence at all in this matter based 
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upon the fact that "the plaintiffs were not ignorant of the facts giving rise to this cause of 
action.5'3 (Record 577). 
There is no genuine issue as to any material fact concerning the Colosimos1 ages, 
and their knowledge of the alleged abuse and its consequences. Again, the Colosimos 
had within their knowledge, at all times, the fact that Mr. Rapp was a priest, an Oblate, 
and a teacher at Judge Memorial High School. Further, they were aware that they had 
allegedly been subjected to abuse by Mr. Rapp, and were aware that they suffered 
damage. Both of the Colosimos were aware of all of the relevant facts for two to three 
decades prior to bringing this cause of action. 
III. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD LONG SINCE RUN ON 
THE COLOSIMOS' CLAIM. 
As argued, supra, the Colosimos' claim that the District Court could not have 
relied upon the dates in their Complaint, as well as Ralph Colosimo's birthdate, in 
dismissing their Complaint. (Brief, p. 18.) The Colosimos appear to argue that they are 
entitled to place whatever dates they would like in the Complaint, and then argue that 
those dates may or may not be accurate, and that they need discovery in order to 
determine the true dates. (Brief, p. 19.) It was the Colosimos that gave the relevant 
3The Colosimos argue that they should have been allowed to amend their 
Complaint, although this issue is not an issue on appeal. To the extent this Court intends 
to entertain this argument, it is inconceivable that there would be any amendment to the 
Complaint which could change the dates of abuse, the Colosimos' knowledge of all 
relevant facts, or their ages. It is unclear what, if anything, the Colosimos could amend in 
order to survive the various Motions brought by the Defendants in this action. 
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dates, absent Ralph Colosimo's birthdate, by which the Oblates brought their Motion to 
Dismiss, and by which the District Court granted the Motion to Dismiss/Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
The Colosimos also claim that they are entitled to rely upon the discovery rule to 
avoid the statute of limitations, and assign error to the District Court. 
A. The Statute of Limitations Is Not Tolled If the Plaintiff Is Aware of 
the Underlying Facts of His Claims or Could Have Timely 
Discovered Them. 
As the Supreme Court stated in Meyers v. McDonald, "mere ignorance of the 
existence of a cause of action does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations." 
Meyers at 86, see also Warren v. Provo City Corp, 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992). 
The discovery rule, tolling the statute of limitations, has three times in which it may be 
invoked: (1) by statute; (2) under the exceptional circumstances argument; and (3) 
because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct. See Warren, at 1129. 
In the Warren decision, Mr. Warren was aware that the plane in question had 
crashed, causing him injury, thereby giving him reasonable grounds to question whether 
or not Provo City was enforcing required ordinances that ensured that the airplanes were 
in an air-worthy condition. See id. The only inquiry that Mr. Warren engaged in was 
making some telephone calls. See id. The Colosimos did not even engage in a 
preliminary investigation of their potential claims even though they were aware of all the 
facts and circumstances surrounding their alleged abuse and injury. 
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The Colosimos, in an attempt to delay the running of the statute of limitations, 
appear to rely on the prong of the discovery rule which pertains to "situations where a 
case presents exceptional circumstances or the application of the general rule would be 
irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that defendant has prevented the discovery 
of the cause of action." Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Utah 1998) (emphasis 
added). However, "[b]efore a period of limitations may be tolled under the [exceptional 
circumstances] version of the discovery rule, an initial showing must be made that the 
plaintiff did not know and could not reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the 
cause of action in time to commence an action within that period..." Id (internal 
citations omitted) (emphasis in the original, underling supplied); see also Olsen v. 
Hooley, 865 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Utah 1993) (holding that limitations period begins to run 
at the point plaintiff recalls the abuse. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated "in determining if summary judgment was 
appropriate, we need review only whether the trial court erred by applying the governing 
law and whether a material fact was in dispute." Holmes Development LLC v. Cook. 
2002 UT 38, f21, 48 P.3d 895; Hill v. Alfred 2001 UT 16, ^ [18, 28 P.3d 1271. As argued 
above, there is no dispute as to any relevant facts, in that the Defendants assumed as true, 
for purposes of the Motions only, that all the facts alleged in the Colosimos' Complaint 
were true. (Record 54-77). However, based upon those facts, the Colosimos5 Complaint 
was time barred under the applicable statute of limitations. Under most circumstances, a 
cause of action accrues "upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the 
17 
cause of action." Meyers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). "Mere ignorance 
of the existence of a cause of action does not prevent a running of the statute of 
limitations." Id at 86. 
The Colosimos have argued, yet again, that "plaintiffs in the instant case admit 
there is absolutely no way the court could have reached such a conclusion from 
information in the complaint here." (Brief, p. 19.) The Oblates submit that every 
relevant fact necessary for the determination that the Colosimos had gone beyond the 
statute of limitations was contained within their Complaint. Further, the District Court 
accepted information outside of the pleadings in ruling on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, including Ralph Colosimo's Affidavit, Ralph Colosimo's birthdate, a 
November 24, 2000 letter that Charles Colosimo sent to Monsignor Fitzgerald of the Salt 
Lake Diocese outlining the abuse he had suffered, and the fact that Charles had been 
seeing a therapist since 1997 specifically concerning the alleged abuse. (Record, 117-
118,237-241,393,577-580). 
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Colosimos were aware at all times that they 
had allegedly suffered abuse at the hands of Mr. Rapp, who was a priest, an Oblate, and a 
teacher at Judge Memorial High School. They were both aware of the abuse either at the 
time that it occurred, in the case of Ralph, or never forgot the abuse, in the case of 
Charles. As the record clearly indicates, Ralph was over the age of 18 for the majority, if 
not all, of the alleged abuse. Charles never forgot the instances of abuse, and both 
individuals knew Mr. Rapp's position. The Colosimos took absolutely no action to 
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investigate their claims within the statutory period whatsoever. Therefore, the 
exceptional circumstances exception to the statute of limitations does not apply. 
B. The Colosimos May Not Rely Upon Fraudulent Concealment To 
Defeat The Statute of Limitations. 
The Colosimos seem to rely most heavily upon the concealment version of the 
Discovery Rule. According to the Utah Supreme Court, this rule "is essentially a claim of 
equitable estoppel, whereby a defendant who causes a delay in the bringing of a cause of 
action is estopped from relying on the statute of limitations as the defense to the action." 
See Warren, at 1130 (citing Forsman v. Forsman, 779 P.2d 218, 220 (Utah 1989)). 
Fraudulent concealment may be used to invoke the discovery rule, however, two 
areas of inquiry are relevant in determining a date on which the appropriate statute of 
limitations began to run: (1) When the plaintiff would reasonably be on notice to inquire 
into the defendant's bad act despite the defendant's attempt to hide those acts; and (2) 
Whether the plaintiff once on notice reasonably would have discovered, with due 
diligence, the facts in which the cause of action was based despite the defendant's efforts 
to hide those facts. See Hill v. Mired 2001 UT 16, ^ [18, 28 P.3d 1271. The court in 
Warren cited several instances wherein they have held summary judgment inappropriate, 
and held summary judgment appropriate. In the instances where summary judgment has 
been held appropriate, the plaintiff was aware of the facts and circumstances surrounding 
his or her alleged injury, but failed to do anything about it, and did not rely upon any 
information, or lack thereof, from the defendants. See Warren, 838 P.2d at 1130. 
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In the Warren case, as in the case before this Court, Mr. Warren did not allege that 
he relied on any representation made by Provo City. Similarly, the Colosimos make no 
allegation that they relied on any representation made by the Oblates. The Colosimos 
allege only that the Oblates intended to "cover up" relevant facts. The only "reliance" 
alleged was the decision to make Mr. Rapp a teacher and priest. (Record 4-6, 10-11, 13-
15). However, this reliance was based upon known facts, that Rapp was a teacher, Oblate 
and priest, yet no attempt was made to determine possible vicarious liability on behalf of 
the Oblates during all these decades. All of the Colosimos5 claims against the Oblates are 
brought pursuant to the theory of Respondent Superior. The "oversight" functions of the 
Oblates were well know to the Colosimos, or easily discoverable. The Colosimos "did 
not take reasonable steps to investigate [the Oblates'] liability." Id "While a party may 
be excused for failing to pursue a claim if the party acted in reasonable reliance on a 
defendant's representations, absent any representations by the defendants, a plaintiff must 
take reasonable steps to prosecute the claim. Otherwise, there can be no showing that the 
defendant's actions prevented the discovery of the cause of action." Id. at 1130. 
The Colosimos waited until May, 2002, at which time they read an article in the 
Washington Post, before even beginning an investigation.4 (See Brief at 22.) There was 
4The Colosimos have not alleged, even at this late date, what they did to 
investigate their claims after 2002, nor do they indicate how they received any of the 
information in their Complaint, without the briefest discovery. They clearly were able to 
ascertain the facts in their Complaint without the benefit of judicial oversight, yet claim 
that they could not have engaged in this discovery until 2002. 
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no attempt on the twenty to thirty years following the time that they could have brought a 
cause of action, to investigate any of their causes of action, up to and including who they 
may bring causes of action against. The Colosimos argue that they can sit on their rights 
until such time as someone does their investigation for them. This is simply not the law 
in the State of Utah. 
While it may be true, for purposes of a Motion to Dismiss that the Colosimos did 
not learn of the facts and circumstances surrounding Rapp until May, 2002, it is because 
they never attempted to find out. This does not excuse them from their obligations to act. 
See Lopez v. United States of America, 998 F. Supp. 1239, 1242-43 (D.N.M.1998). To 
allow the plaintiffs to postpone filing an action until they had been "passively informed 
by an outside source that [their injuries were] negligently inflicted would serve to 
undermine the purpose of the limitations statute...." Bradley v. United States. 951 F.2d 
268, 271 (10th Cir. 1991). 
As stated, the Colosimos Complaint alleges numerous causes of action against 
Rapp and the Oblates, apparently under a respondent superior relationship. This 
relationship was not changed or altered in the past twenty to thirty years, when no 
investigation was ever undertaken. The Colosimos do not even claim that they took the 
basic actions like Mr. Warren in making a couple of phone calls in order to find 
information. The Colosimos did nothing for twenty to thirty years and waited for an 
article to come out in the Washington Post indicating that Mr. Rapp had been in Utah. 
This inaction cannot be excused under the laws of the State of Utah. "While a party may 
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be excused for failing to pursue a claim if the party acted in reasonable reliance on a 
defendant's representations, absent any representations by the defendant, a plaintiff must 
take reasonable steps to prosecute the claims. Otherwise, there can be no showing that 
the defendant's actions prevented the discovery of the cause of action." Warren, at 1130. 
As in the Warren case, the Colosimos did not allege any facts that demonstrate that 
they took reasonable steps to pursue any claim, or that they reasonably relied on any 
representation made by the Oblates. Therefore, they cannot properly rely upon the 
fraudulent concealment exception to the discovery rule. The Colosimos' only argument 
is that if they would have asked, they would not have been told the truth. Utah law does 
not support or permit this argument. See Olsen v. Hooley. 865 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Utah 
1993) (holding that limitations period begins to run at the point plaintiff recalls the 
abuse.); Warren v. Provo City. 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992); Russell/Packard 
Development Inc. v. Carson. 2003 UT App 316, f^lO, 78 P.3d 616 (citing Dansie v. 
Anderson Lumber Co.. 878 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)); Hill v. Alfred 2001 
UT 16,1J18, 28P.3dl271. 
C. The Colosimos Failed To Allege Fraud With Specificity. 
The Colosimos' allege in their Brief that the discovery rule would also be 
applicable in that it is mandated by statute. (Brief, pp. 23-24.) The basis for this 
argument is that the Colosimos believe that by alleging fraud, they are no longer bound 
by the statute of limitations. The Colosimos fail to cite a single case in support of this 
proposition. 
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As before the District Court, the Colosimos continued to restate that the Oblates 
failed to warn them of Rapp's tendencies, or to remove Rapp after allegedly hearing 
complaints about his behavior, thus resulting in a "stamp of approval." (Record 230 -
232). There were no citations given before the District Court, nor are there any contained 
within their Brief, holding that an implied, silent, "stamp of approval" constitutes a 
sufficient misrepresentation for purposes of stating a claim for fraud. The Colosimos 
seem to argue, yet again, that under Utah's liberalized pleadings rules, they have no 
obligation to follow Rule 9(b). (Record 232). Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure specifically require that claims for fraud be pled with particularity, and this has 
been reinforced by the Utah Supreme Court. DeBrv v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 443 (Utah 
1995). 
The Colosimos have not alleged any affirmative statements which could be 
construed as fraudulent, nor have the Oblates defendants made any such statements. 
Further, the Colosimos have failed to identify to whom such non-existent statements were 
made, when they were made, or how the Colosimos could reasonably rely on such 
statements. The Colosimos have failed to allege that the Oblates made any material 
misrepresentations with the requisite intent that the Colosimos relied upon these 
misrepresentations in a way which resulted in their being abused by Mr. Rapp. The 
Colosimos did not even allege that "but for" these non-existent statements, the alleged 
abuse would not have occurred. 
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The Colosimos seem to argue that they are entitled to rely on omissions for the 
purpose of bringing an action for fraud. (Record 230 - 233). The Colosimos however, 
fail to allege any omissions, or their reasonable reliance thereon, in their claim for fraud. 
(Record 13 - 14). The Colosimos' claim seems to be based entirely on these purported 
misrepresentations regarding defendants' alleged "stamp of approval." The Colosimos 
failed, and continue to fail, to allege what statement or statements were made, who made 
the alleged "statements," to whom they were made, when they were made, that the 
plaintiffs' were aware that they were made, or that they reasonably relied upon such 
statements to their detriment, that being the abuse allegedly suffered at the hands of Mr. 
Rapp. It is unclear as to how they are not claiming to rely on alleged misstatements or 
omissions in support of their fraud claim. The Colosimos merely stated that "such 
conduct clearly constitutes a misrepresentation" in that the "defendants . . .did not 
disclose this knowledge and, in fact, affirmatively concealed it; therefore they committed 
fraud." (Record 231). It is beyond dispute that this type of allegation is insufficient as a 
matter of law to state a claim for fraud. See Chapman v. Primary Childrens Hospital. 784 
P.2dll81, 1186 (Utah 1989). 
Therefore, beyond the essential fact that the Colosimos took no action whatsoever 
to investigate their claims, they did not even properly allege a cause of action for fraud 
consistent with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Colosimos attempt to confuse 
fraudulent concealment for purposes of the discovery rule, and actual fraud, must fail as a 
matter of law. 
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D. The Nevada Case of Petersen v. Bruen Is Not The Law In The 
State Of Utah. 
The Colosimos ask this Court to adopt the reasoning in the Nevada Supreme Court 
case of Petersen v. Bruea 792 P.2d 18 (Nev. 1990). Contrary to the Colosimos' 
assertion that this "decision that has been cited across the nation," only two States have 
adopted the reasoning in Bruen. The two States are Nevada and Michigan. See Meiers-
Post v. Schafer 427 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). Those States allow the 
statute of limitations to be tolled where memory is repressed and corroborating evidence 
of plaintiff s testimony exists. While both Michigan and Nevada have somewhat 
different standards than the Utah Courts, the Michigan Court will only toll the applicable 
limitations period if the memory of the victim was repressed and corroborating evidence 
exists. 
The Utah Appellate Courts have handled this issue on numerous occasions since 
the Petersen v. Bruen case, and have not adopted its reasoning. In order for the 
Colosimos to invoke the discovery rule for the purposes of tolling the statute of 
limitations, the Utah Supreme Court has held: 
"An unbroken line of cases dealing with the application of the 
discovery rule, we have made it very clear that: before a period 
of limitations may be tolled under the [exceptional 
circumstances] version [] of the discovery rule, an initial 
showing must be made that the plaintiff did not know and could 
not reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the cause of 
action and time to commence an action within that period." 
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Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235, 137 (Utah 1998) (alternations in original) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Walter Drug Co. v. LaSal Oil Co.. 902 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995)); and 
citing O'Neil v. Division of Family Servs.. 821 P.2d 1139, 1144 (Utah 1991) stating that 
ignorance of facts giving rise to a cause of action is prerequisite to application of the 
discovery rule); Olsen v. Hooley. 865 P.2d 1345, 1350 (Utah 1993) (holding that limitations 
period begins to run at the point that the plaintiff recalls the abuse). Each and every one of 
these cases came after the Nevada case, and failed to adopt its reasoning in any manner 
whatsoever. 
The Nevada Court found that Nevada statutory authority only contained general 
statutes of limitations which were inapplicable under the circumstances before it: (1) The 
defendant had been criminally convicted of sexually abusing the plaintiff before the 
plaintiff brought his civil complaint; (2) Nevada had no specific statute of limitations for 
sex abuse cases, which led the court to conclude that the Nevada legislature "did not 
specifically contemplate" child sexual abuse in its general statute of limitations; and (3) 
The plaintiff was only five years late in bringing his claim. See Petersen. 792 P.2d at 19. 
The Utah legislature has adopted a specific statute of limitations with respect to child 
sexual abuse. See U.C.A. § 78-12-25.1. The Utah legislature has clearly considered this 
issue, and has flatly rejected the analysis of the Nevada Supreme Court. 
Therefore, even if the plaintiffs had clear and convincing evidence that they were 
in fact abused, the Utah legislature has already determined that there is an applicable 
statute of limitations, and according to the case law in the State of Utah, the statute of 
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limitations has long since past.5 The District Court relied upon well founded and long 
standing Utah Appellate Court authority in making its decision, and properly ruled, using 
that existing case law, that the Colosimos would not be entitled to present evidence at all 
in this matter, let alone raise evidence that would rise to the level of clear and convincing. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS' CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT 
MERIT. 
As argued throughout this brief, the District Court properly ruled that the statute of 
limitations had run on the claims based upon the fact that the Colosimos knew of the 
events surrounding their alleged abuse and injuries, and failed to pursue their claims on 
those causes of action within the applicable limitations period. In a novel argument, the 
Colosimos argue that the District Court's ruling violates the open court provision of the 
Utah Constitution, and the Due Process, Equal Protection, and right to trial by jury 
provisions of the Utah and Federal Constitutions. Those arguments are yet another 
attempt to excuse their own failure to investigate and pursue their own claims and would 
essentially render all statutes of limitations unconstitutional and meaningless. 
The Colosimos had access to the courts at anytime within the statute of limitations 
after the abuse occurred, but failed to avail themselves of their legal remedies. This 
Court may very well be faced with a different issue entirely if the Colosimos brought 
their claims timely, and despite their reasonable diligence in pursuing their claims, were 
5For purposes of the Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment, it was taken as true 
that the abuse occurred. 
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unable to find any evidence of fraud or breach of fiduciary duty based upon the 
concealment of the necessary facts by the Oblates. The Court need not reach this issue 
simply because the plaintiffs did not bring their claims withing the applicable time frame. 
The Colosimos cite to no case or statutory authority which stands for the proposition that 
imposition of a statute of limitation under these circumstances is unconstitutional. 
In order to show a statute of limitations violates the open court provision, the 
Colosimos must prove that the statute cuts off a cause of action before they knew, or 
reasonably should have known that a cause of action existed. See Clements v. Conrad, 
21 S.W.3d 5 L4, 521 (Tex. Ct .App. 2000) (finding plaintiff knew of cause of action 
before statute of limitation expired and therefore statute did not violate constitutional 
guarantee of access to court). In other words, a statute of limitations does not violate the 
open court provision if the plaintiff has knowledge of the elements of a cause of action 
within the limitations period. The necessary elements of a cause of action are the injuries 
it caused and the potentially culpable party if known. See id. see also Avis v. Board of 
Review of the Industrial Commissions, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) "State 
legislatures possess the discretion to enact statute of limitations, and these statutes are 
presumptively constitutional." McHenry v. Utah Valley Hospital 724 F. Supp. 835, 837 
(D. Utah 1989). "[A] statute of limitations is constitutionally sound if it should allow a 
reasonable, not unlimited, time in which to bring suit." Id. "What shall be considered 
reasonable time must be settled by the judgment of the legislature, and the courts will not 
inquire into the wisdom of establishing a period of legal bar unless the time allowed is 
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manifestly so insufficient that the statute becomes a denial of justice." Id (quoting 
Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 63, 22 S. Ct. 573, 575, 46 L.Ed. 804 (1902)). The 
courts have recognized exceptions to alleviate the harsh effects of statutes of limitations, 
but the exceptions involve cases where "plaintiff[s] have no way of knowing the injuries 
had occurred until after the statute had run and therefore know way of affixing or 
exploring potential liability within the statutory period." McHenry, 724 F. Supp. at 839; 
Avis. 837 P.2d at 587. 
According to Ralph Colosimos' allegations, Ralph suffered "obvious physical and 
emotional harm that resulted immediately from the abuse." (Record 7) (emphasis added). 
Further, Ralph Colosimo was 18 years of age during most if not all of the abuse. (Record 
54 - 77). Charles Colosimo makes no claim that he repressed any of the memories of the 
abuse, or of its effect. Therefore, there is no justifiable reason for waiting two to three 
decades to bring the cause of action There is nothing in the Colosimos arguments that 
changes these facts. 
The Colosimos final argument concerning their constitutional challenge simply has 
no merit. They are not entitled to a trial by jury when they are not entitled to bring then-
cause of action. If the statute of limitations is constitutional they have no right to bring 
anything before a jury. As the District Court properly pointed out, the Colosimos were 
not entitled to present evidence on any of these issues based upon their failure to file then-
claims timely. 
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V. THE QUESTION OF THE OBLATES FIDUCIARY DUTY IS 
PRECLUDED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
In the Court below, the plaintiffs attempted to secure a lower standard of proof by 
urging a higher standard of care - a fiduciary duty - on the Oblates. As argued in the 
prior points, the Colosimos never alleged or offered any evidence that the Oblates 
affirmatively concealed its relationship to Rapp (or its relationship to the plaintiffs5 
themselves) so this avenue of liability is foreclosed by the statute of limitations. The 
determination of a duty to act must be answered by the court, based upon an examination 
of the church/clergy and church/parishioner relationship. See Berenda v. Langford. 914 
P.2d 45, 54 (Utah 1996). This would require the type of judicial inquiry into the 
religious cannon law and ecclesiastic duties that was specifically prohibited by the Utah 
Supreme Court as violative of the Establishment Clause under the First Amendment. See 
Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. 2001 UT 25,1fl[14-15, 2 1 P 3 d 
198; see also Hill v. Alfred 2001 UT 16, ^[21, 28 P.3d 1271; Anderson v. Dean Witter, 
Reynolds. Inc.. 920 P.2d 575, 579 (Utah 1996). 
As argued, the Utah Courts have consistently held that the issue of vicarious 
liability is properly decided as a matter of law. See J.H. by D.H. v. West Valley City. 
840 P.2d 1115, 1123 (Utah 1992); Jackson v. Righter. 891 P.2d 1387, 1391 (Utah 1995); 
Berkner v. Salt Lake County. 771 P.2d 1053, 1057-58 (Utah 1989). The Colosimos were 
always aware of who Mr. Rapp was, who he worked for, and the titles that he held. In 
order to determine whether or not he was "worthy" of these positions, the Court must 
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engage in the type of inquiry specifically prohibited under Franco. Further, these areas of 
inquiry could have and should have been analyzed decades ago in order to determine the 
liability, if any, of the Oblates. The relevant facts were never concealed. 
The Colosimos rely, in some part, upon a Vatican document, for the proposition 
that there was a strategy of deliberate concealment of sexual abuse. (Record, 501-539; 
Brief, p. 6.) The Vatican document in question was held to have been hearsay, not 
authenticated, and not properly before the District Court. (Record 579-80.) The issues 
surrounding the alleged document are not on appeal, and should be disregarded by this 
Court for the same reasons that it was disregarded by the District Court. (Record 579-
80.) 
IV. THE OBLATES ADOPT THE ARGUMENTS OF THE CO-
DEFENDANTS IN THIS MATTER. 
Pursuant to Rule 24(h) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Oblates 
specifically and affirmatively join in and adopt the arguments of each of the co-appellees 
in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court properly dismissed the Colosimos' Complaint, with prejudice, 
based upon the applicable statutes of limitations that have been enacted by the Utah State 
Legislature, and interpreted by Utah's appellate courts. 
Therefore, the Oblates respectfully request that this Court affirm the decision of 
the District Court in its entirety. 
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DATED this 6th day of July, 2004. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
tusselTC. Fericks 
Mark L. McCarty 
Attorneys for Oblates of St. Francis De 
Sales, Thomas P. O'Neill, Francis J. 
Gross, and W. Ivan Cendese 
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